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Def. Doc. No. 1316

EXCERPTS TAKEN FROM INTERROGATION

J. VON RIBBENTROP

20 SEPTEMBER 1945

NUREMBERG

ANTI - COMINTERN PACT

Def. Doc. No. 1316

Q. That clears up one difficulty which I had.

A. No. I think that what you perhaps are thinking of is originally when the Fuehrer first wanted to have good relations with Japan.

Q. Yes.

A. This was then more from the "Weltanschauungs" standpoint, and perhaps what you are thinking of is the anti-comintern pact, which I think was closed, it may have been 1936, I am not quite sure.

Q. I think the date is December, 1936.

A. But that was more of a Weltanschauungs pact, which was closed against the propaganda of Bolshevism and so on, which was closed, I think, first with Japan, and later Italy joined, and then, of course, later during the war a number of other states joined it, but that was anti-Comintern. That had nothing to do with the United States then.

Q. You describe it as Weltanschaulich and at the same time as being anti-Russian.

A. Anti-Bolshevik, anti-Communist, against activities of what we called the Comintern, which was working in Moscow and had branches, secret or open, practically all over the world. Then, you see, especially also in Germany.

Q. It is very interesting, of course, I have been under the impression that it was not only the Weltanschauung, in the manner that you speak of, but was a factor in the balance of power.

A. Well, I don't think one can say that. It was really, in the first place, a Weltanschauung matter. At the same time, of course, you know, we had a very strong anti-Bolshevik, and anti-Communist line in Germany. It was quite natural to cooperate with states like Japan who didn't want Communist activities and so on.

Whose idea was that pact? Who originated the idea of that pact?

A. Well, I don't really know. How did it come about? The Fuehrer occasionally saw the Japanese. I saw them quite often. We have then an anti-Comintern place in Berlin, an institution which was called the anti-Comintern. While

out of this, the whole thing more or less originated, it was an idea which more or less came in discussion with the Fuehrer and with me and with the Japanese. We wanted to have good relations with the Japanese. The Fuehrer once told me -- this really dates back as far as '33 -- that he would like to have good relations with Japan, and that he believed Japan to be a nation with which one could have good relations and so on. That dated back quite a long way. So this sort of thing gradually developed and that is the way we came to the anti-Comintern pact.

Q. I must speak rather pointedly. You and I were acquainted in Berlin and you have been the Foreign Minister of Germany, experienced in diplomacy. You do not expect me to believe that so important a step was taken simply for reasons of ideology. I accept your statement in some large part, but it is impossible for me to believe that so important a step in foreign policy could be taken on those grounds, alone. There must have been the thought of considerations, which I describe as balance of power. You can describe them how you will, but you understand what I am talking about.

A. That may be so, but there was nothing really, let us say, purely political, which came out of it. You see, it came this way. I remember that I talked to the British Foreign Minister than one day about it, and we were very much anti-Bolshevik and Anti-Soviet. As a matter of fact, anti-Comintern, let us say. I remember talking to this English Foreign Minister and telling him, after that pact had been closed, the anti-Comintern pact, that it was perfectly open for Great Britain to join, for instance. I remember that. I should like to say this: it was the idea of the Fuehrer of establishing a general anti-Communist front, more or less.

Q. So far as Great Britain is concerned, there had been an Anglo-Japanese alliance until 1922 ?

A. Yes.

Q. He had been in open alliance with Japan until 1922 ?

A. I know that the English then did not like the idea very much. They did not want to take an attitude in the matter, I remember that.

Q. Was the Foreign Office a participant, or did the Foreign Office know that this was going on ?

A. I couldn't tell you exactly about that. I know one thing for sure, that it was signed, I think, by myself, on a particular order of the Fuehrer, but I am sure the

Fuehrer discussed it with the Foreign Minister von Neurath.

Q. What was Germany's earlier policy in the Far East with regards to China, for example?

A. Well, there was a policy, of course, of where we had good relations, as far as I remember, with China.

Q. Hitler ordered the withdrawal of the German military missions in China in '38, according to my recollection. However, these precise facts are not what I am endeavoring to establish, but I am troubled about this situation: the anti-Comintern pact marked a very definite change in Germany's relations with Russia. Up to that time, German relations with Russia had been marked by the Reppolo policy and, concurrently, Germany had maintained markedly friendly relations with China.

The anti-Comintern pact reversed both of these important lines of policy. Therefore, I am exceedingly surprised to have you characterize the anti-Comintern pact as almost altogether ideological and without much political significance.

A. One can say this: with the getting into power of the National Socialism, the Reppolo policy, I mean with the antagonism between the Weltanschauungen, would come to an end, which came up in the "Parteitag" in '33 when very hard speeches were made against Bolshevism. So I think one can say that the change of policy toward Russia -- later on, China -- could be marked down with the 3rd of January, 1933, when it started, and the anti-Comintern pact of '36 was a consequence, you see of this fundamental divergency between the Communistic and the National Socialist doctrine, which I later tried to, in '39 overbridge again and try to get Russia in an entirely new line. But at that time, I think it is not wrong to say, that the fundamental part was the question of world perception and, of course, it is no doubt that having these two Weltanschauungen standing against each other, that there is a political element in that. There is no doubt about that. So far as that is concerned, there is no doubt that the anti-Comintern pact had a political element of some kind, but more in the way of what was very much in the mind of the Fuehrer at that time -- it is very difficult to explain an idea which the Fuehrer always had in mind, for creating a world front against Communistic activities everywhere. That was one of his fundamental ideas, really, which perhaps to a certain extent, also played a role later on in the German-Russian war of '41.

Q. I just offer you this hypothesis; That a political pact was contemplated between Germany and Japan --

A. Then ?

Q. Yes -- that this was intended, but it could hardly be called a non-aggression pact, because the two countries were far apart; and so Raumer had this bright idea of calling it an anti-Comintern pact because the Soviet Government had recently declared that the Comintern was not an official organ of the Soviet Government. Do not these remarks of mine stir up some recollections ?

A. It is quite possible that Raumer said that name first. I think he had some connection with the anti-Comintern, it is possible, the anti-Comintern action, but he didn't create the name because the name was there. The name was there as an action with an office (SIC), I think, which was attached to either the Propaganda Ministry or some other thing. That is where the name came from.

Q. You wouldn't say that the name was more or less a false facade. I say more or less because I recognize some justice in your earlier remarks, but wasn't it a facade to cover up what was really a plain, everyday balance of power treaty between Germany and Japan ?

A. I don't think that is what it was. It wasn't a disguise pact, but there is no doubt that, in general, there was the idea of having good relations with Japan. That is the way I think it came about, that we came to the Weltanschauung pact or the anti-Comintern, but it is quite possible that Raumer mentioned that first. That is quite possible, but I don't think he created it because there was always this anti-Comintern action, which was there. You see, I remember discussing with the Fuehrer later on, that it would be very good and useful, if Great Britain would enter a thing like I remember that, But the English didn't want it at that time. One thing is quite right, that it had its political elements, there is no doubt. It is a change I wouldn't say a change, but it was a consequence of the change of policy of 1933, you see, which came with the arrival of National Socialism, which then, of course, was anti-Communist. This was the first step. You know, later on quite a number of other countries joined it. Italy joined it and a number of others.

Q. Tell us about the Bureau Ribbentrop. I don't know whether that was its official title, you know what I mean.

A. That wasn't the official title. It was called that. I think I have explained before about the Bureau Ribbentrop. It was an office, let us say, a part of the "ational Social-

istic Party, which really consisted of myself and, perhaps I don't know, perhaps a dozen collaborators or something like that, with a number of other people who had, during those years, looked after, so to speak, the semi-official, not official, channels of relationships with various foreign countries. For instance, we specialized, really, on England and France in those years. That is to say, with France, to get good relations with France, and good relations with Great Britain. That was more or less the chief object, I would like to say, of the Bureau Ribbentrop in those years.

Q. But it also occupied itself with the Japanese questions?

A. It occupied itself also with Japanese questions, to a certain extent, but I don't think very much. Then to a certain extent with Polish questions, but that was only later, I think, and with, perhaps one or two or three other countries. I wouldn't say it was really formed, but it came about that way. I was a collaborator of the Fuehrer in foreign politics since 1933 and as I wanted to have some place where to sit, that is how it really came about. I got a number of rooms in the Party office of Hess, at that time, Deputy of the Fuehrer, in the Wilhelmstrasse. I got a number of rooms where and I got a number of collaborators. Raumer, which you mentioned, was one of them. From where I made my trips, especially to Paris and London, but they were the chief trips really, I think, where I went in order to try and establish between relations with France and England. You know, of course, that we were in those years very much after and tried to get, the Anglo-German alliance; that was really the main object.

Q. Well, in effect, it became official later?

A. Well, it had no official position, no. I became official after 1934 when I moved over to the Foreign Office in 1934. I don't know whether you know that. When I was made Disarmament Commissioner, I moved over in '34 to the Foreign Office, but the Bureau Ribbentrop as you called it, that remained there and looked after these sort of semi-official relations with Anglo-German fellowship, Committee France-Allemagne.

Q. However, they negotiated, or assisted you to negotiate this treaty with Japan.

A. That is right.

Def. Doc. No. 1316

A. Let me see, this was handled with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. I had, of course, use of the code as Disarmament Commissioner in the Foreign Office, but the Bureau Ribbentrop didn't have any code, not the code of the Foreign Office.

Q. OSHIMA was the Japanese military attache ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the German Ambassador in Japan at that time ? It was Dirksen, was it not ?

A. I think so.

Q. Dirksen succeeded you in London, didn't he ?

A. Yes.

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step 1316

リッペントロップ尋問書記

一九四五年九月二十日

ミュルンベルク

防 共 協 定

問 それでかねてからの私の疑問が解ける。

答 いや、多分貴方の考へておられるのは、抑も協定が始めて日本と友好関係を持ちたいと考へた頃のことだろうと思ふが。

問 然り。

答 之は當時はもつと世界觀的立場からだつた。多分貴方の考へておられるのは防共協定のことでせう、確か締結されたのは一九三六年だつたかと思ふが、はつきりはいへません。

問 一九三六年の十二月だと思ふ。

答 しかしあれはむしろ世界觀協定で、ボルシェビズムの宣傳その他に對して締結されたものだ、最初は日本とだつたと思ふ、後イタリイが加はり、勿論更に戦争中他の多くの國が加盟したが、それはあくまで

共的なものだつた。當時米國とは何の關係もなかつた。

問 貴方は世界觀的といひながら又同時に反露的であるといふ。

答 反ボルシェビキ、反共產主義的、モスコに本拠を置き、殆ど全世界に亘る秘密若くは公然の支部組織を有する。ドイツに於て特に然りである。

・ コミンテルンの活動に對抗するもの、といふ意味です。

問 勿論それは大體面白い、しかし私は貴方のいふやうに單に世界觀の問題ではなく、勢力均衡の一素因だつたといふ風に考へてゐたのだが。

答 いや、さうはいへないと思ふ。それは全く、先づ何より世界觀の問題だ。

勿論それと同時に、ドイツには、知らるゝやうに強い反ボルシェビキ、反共產主義的傾向がある。日本のやうな、共產主義的活動等を好まない國と協力するのは、全く當然のことであつた。

問 協定は誰の考へか。誰がその協定を始め考へついたか。

答 さあ、よく知りません。どうしてさういふ考へが出て來たか。總統は時折日本人と面談し、私は又戸々日本人と云つてゐた。ベルリンには當時「コミンテルン」に反對する所が一つあた、即ち「アンチ・コミンテルン」と呼ばれ

Heft #13/6

る機關がそれだ。こゝから多かれ少われ全部の事が生じたが、又一方それは多かれ少かれ總統や私や日本人と協議して生れた考だつた。我々は日本と友好關係を保たうと欲した。總統は嘗て私に、これは一九三三年に迎るが日本と是非友好關係を保ちたい、又日本は十分之と友好關係を保ち得るやうな國だと信ずる。と語つたことがある。之はずつと昔の話だが。このやうに此種の事は徐々に進歩した。防共協定締結に至る經濟は以上の通りです。問一寸辛竊に聞えるか、知れないが、貴方と私とはベルリンでの知己であり、又貴方はかねてドイツ國外務大臣として外交に經驗が深い。單にイデオロギ一のためにかゝる重大な措置が執られたと私が信ずるとは貴方も思ふまい。貴方のいふことは大体に於て頷けるが、之等の理由で、かゝる重大な外交政策上の措置が執られたとは私には彌信ぜられない。私が勢力の均衡といつたやうな、種々考慮すべきものがあつたに相違ない。貴方はそれを如何やうにも呼ぶことは出来る。しかし私の言つてあることも判つてもらへると思ふ。答それはさうかも知れませんが、しかしそこから出て來た——え——と、純政治的なものは何一つなかつたのです。かういふ都合だつたのです。今でも覺え

Ref Doc #1316
であります。或時英國の外務大臣にそれに就て話したことがあります。我々は
何れもボルシェビキ内至ソヴェットに對しては極力反對の意見でした。實の所
コミテルン反對だつたのです。私は此の協定——防共協定が成立した後に、此
の英國外相と會談して、本協定は、例へば英國に對してもその参加を拒むもの
では決してないと話したことを覚えてゐる。私はかういひたい。それは、多か
れ少かれ一般的防共戰線を樹立しようといふ總統の考だつたのです。
問、英國に關する限り、一九二二年迄日英同盟が存在してゐましたね。

答、然り

問、英國は一九二二年迄日本と公然同盟を結んでゐました。

答、當時英國がかういふ考を余り好まなかつたことは承知してゐます。それについ
て英國はある態度を執ることを欲しなかつた、それは私も覚えてゐます。

問、外務省はそれに參與したか、それとも、外務省は此事の進行してゐるのを待つ
てゐたか。

答、それについては正確なことは言へません。唯一つ確かなのは、その協定が總統
の特別の命令によつて、確か私自身が調印したものだといふことです。しかし

Ref Doc #1316

總統はノライト外務大臣と之を論議されたことは確かです

問ドイツの初期の極東政策、例へば支那に對するものはどうでしたか。

答え、勿論、私の覺えである限り、如何なる點に支那と友好關係を保つかといふ政策はあつたと思ひます。

問私の記憶に従へば、ノライトは一九三八年中國にあるドイツ軍事使節の引揚を命じた。しかし之等の正確な事實が、私の今立證しようとしてゐることはないの、私はかういふ事柄について心配してゐるのだ、即ち防共協定はドイツの對露關係に極めて明確な變化を與へた、といふ點だ。その時迄ドイツの對露關係はレボロ政策によつて特徴づけられてゐたと共に、ドイツは中國と極めて友好的な關係を維持してゐた。防共協定は之等の重大なる政策方針の何れとも相反するものであつた。だから、貴方が防共協定の特色を全くイデオロギー的であつて、政治的重要性のない點に求めたのに私は一驚したのである。

問かういふことが出来た、即ち國民社會主義の政權獲得と共に、世界觀相互の國爭を伴ふレボロ政策は、事實それは、ボルシェビズム

Ref Doc #1316

問

反對の激烈なる演説の行はれた一九三三年の黨大會に於て到來したのである。故に、對露政策、後には對支政策の變化は、それが始まつた一九三三年一月三日を以て一期を劃するものが出来る。そして、一九三六年の防共協定は此の共產主義國國民社會主義との間の根本的相違の一つの結果に通じない。後に、一九三九年私はこの兩者の相違點を妥協させ、ロシヤに全く新しい政策をとらせようと試みた。しかし當時に於ては、かういつても間違ではないと思ふが、根本的の點は世界認識の問題だつたこと、又之等の世界觀を互に對立せしめ、そして其處に政治的の一要素があるといふことは勿論疑ふ余地がありません。それは全く疑ない所です。それに関する限り防共協定が或種の政治的要素を有したことは疑ありません、しかしそれはむしろ當時の總統の胸の中にあつたうな、非常に説明しにくいのだが、何處に於ても共産主義的活動に對して世界的反共戰線を作るといふ總統が常に心に抱いてゐた考なのです。それは實に彼の根本的な考の一つであり、恐らく又或程まで後の一九四一年の獨逸戰爭に於ても一つの役割を果したもののなのです。問一寸こんな假設を出してみよう。假に日獨間にある政治的協定が企圖された

Ref. Loc #1316

として
答それ下？

問うん。それが企てられた、だがしかしそれは不可侵條約ことは出来
ない。何故なら兩國は遠く相隔つてゐるから。そこ「ラオマー」は之を防共
協定と呼ぶといふ旨い者に思ひついた、それはコミンテルンはソ聯政府の
公式機關に非ずと、最近ソ聯政府が宣明してゐなから「あつた。かうい
たら、何か思ひ出すことがないか

答 成程「ラオマー」が始めて其名を口にしたのかも知れません。彼は反コミンテ
ルン協定と、多分反コミンテルン活動とも關係があつたと思ふ。しかし彼
が其の名を創始したのではない、前からその名はあつた。「す」。その名は
確か宣撫省か何かの附屬の或る官廳に關する活動として前から存在したの
「す」。之がその名の由來なの「す」。

問 貴方はどうしても、その名前が多少ともカムフラージュだつたと云はない。
私は多少とも貴方「これ」までの言葉を正しいと認めるからこそ言ふのだが
それは實は明白な、普通の勢力均衡條約であることを隠すためのカムフラージュ

File #1316

ジユアはなかつたのか。

答私はいやなかつたと思ふ。それは偽装の協定ではなく、大体に於て、日本と友誼關係を保たうといふ考があつたことは疑ありません。それが出来たのは、つまり我々がその世界觀協定内平反コミンテル協定を結ぶに至つたのは、かううにしてだつたの「す。が、或はラオマーが最初にそれを口にしたのかも知れませんが、それはあり得ることです、しかし彼がそれを創り出したとは思へません、何故なら此の反コミンテルン活動といふものは常に存在したのですから。後に總統と、若し英國がかういふ條約に加つたら益く有益であらうと語したことを覚えてあります。今でも私はそれを覚えております。しかし英國は當時それを欲しなかつたの「す。唯一つ正しいことは、それが政治的要素を有してゐたことです。それは疑ありません。それは一つの變化です、いう變化といふより、一九三三年の政策變更の一つの結果だつたのです。御承知のうちに、その政策の變更はいふまでもなく當時反共主義的だつた國民社會主義の到來と共に起つたものです。之が第一歩で、後に御承知のうちに他の多數の國々が加盟しました、イタリ

Ref Doc #1316

が先づ加はり更に他の多数の國々が

間リツベントロツブ局について話して下さい。それは役所の名前なのかどうか

か私には判りませんが私のいふ意味が判りますね。

答役所の名前ではありませんでした。さう呼ばれはありましたが、リツベント

トロツブ局については前に説明したことがあると思ひます。それはナチ黨

の一部局で私自身も、それからよく知りませんが多分十二人位の協力者

と、他に若干の人達とから成つて居り、最近數年間に、非公式半官的の通

路を通しての諸外國との關係を求めたのです。例へば、近年は専ら英

佛兩國に集中してゐました。即ちフランスと友好關係を結び、又イギリス

とも友好關係を結ぶために。それが多かれ少かれ最近數年間のリツベント

ツブ局の主要目的だつたと私はいひたいのです。

同じかしそれは又日本の問題にも携つてゐましたね。

答或る程度日本の問題にも携りましたが大してはありせん。又或る程

度ポーランドの問題にも携りましたが、それはもつと後のことだつたと思

ひます。それから他に二三の國々にも。私はそれがさういふ風に組織され

Ref No. #1316

たといふの「はありません、そいふ風に出来たのです

私は一九三三年以來外交問題について總統の協力者「ありました、私はどこかに占めるべき地位を欲したのですこれがどうしてその地位が出来たかといふこと「あります。當時私はウイルヘルム街にある總統代理ヘス黨事務所の中にいくつかの部屋を得た。そこに若干の協力者を得た。貴方のいはれたラオマーはその中の一人です。そこから、私は就中バリーとロンドンへ旅行しました、それは實際主要な旅行でしたが、私がバリーやロンドンへ行つたのは佛英國と一層友好的な關係を確立せんがためでした。勿論御承知のうちに、我々は近年英獨同盟を大いに希望し之を成就せんと努力しました。それが實際主要なる目的だつたのです。

問 盧程、事實それは後に公式のものとなつたのだね。

答 いやそれは何等公的の地位を持たなかつたのです。私が官吏となつたのは私が外務省に移つた一九三四年以後のことです。——がそれを御存知かどうかは知りませんが。一九三四年私が宣統委員となつた時、外務省に移つたのです、貴方のいはゆるリッペントロップ局は引續き存続し、此種の、

Ref. Doc #1316

英獨協會佛獨委員との半官的關係を適當してゐました。

問しかし、彼等は日本と此の條約を折衝し又は貴方が折衝するのを援助した
答さうです

答えと、之は伯林駐存日本大使館との間に行はれました。勿論私は外務省電
縮委員として電信暗號を使用してゐましたが、リツベントロツプ局は同等
の電信暗號を持たず、外務省の電信暗號も使用してゐなかつたのです。

問大島は當時の大使館付陸軍武官でしたか

答然り

問當時の駐日獨逸大使は誰でしたか。デイルクセンでしたか

答さうだと思ふ

問デイルクセンはロンドンに於ける貴方の後任でしたね

答然り